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MR. JAYNES AND THE BICAMERAL MIND: 
A CASE STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF BELIEF 
Why does anyone take seriously Mr. Jaynes' view that 
consciousness had its origin in the breakdown of what he calls the 
bicameral mind? 1 To approach Mr. Jaynes' book in the context of 
this question has the advantage of leading us away from the book 
itself and into the sociology of knowledge rather, into what is 
better called the sociology of belief. To think of the book as a 
case study in the sociology of belief, justifies our making a rather 
detailed analysis of it: only in this way can we see how implausible 
Mr. Jaynes conclusions are and so lay the basis for answering the 
question: Why, despite its implausibility, is the book taken 
seriously by thoughtful and intelligent people? 
Mr. Jaynes' major contentions are, first, that four great 
changes -- changes not previously noted by any historian of culture 
occurred towards the end of the third millennium BC and, second that, 
taken together, these changes account for the leading features of 
post-third-millennium culture. 
One of these four changes was a radical transformation of 
human experience from a completely unthinking, stimulus-response type 
of behavior to the self-conscious, reflective type of experience that 
we are familiar with today. 
A second change was a change in the mode of social control 
from an automatic control -- never before identified by any student 
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of social or political behavior, but analogous to the control a 
hypnotist exerts over his patients -- to the nonautomatic kinds of 
control -- by threat, cajolery, bribery, or rational persuasion 
that we know today. 
The third change was a change in the incidence of what 
Mr. Jaynes calls "florid, unmedicated" schizophrenia: before the end 
of the third millennium Be "everyone was schizophrenic" (p. 405), 
and, what is more, everyone was schizophrenic all the time (p. 140). 
Thereafter the incidence greatly declined. 
The fourth change was a change in the function of that area 
on the right hemisphere that corresponds to Wernicke's area on the 
left hemisphere. 
Since it appears -- judging both by the title of the book 
and also by the amount of space devoted to "the origin of 
consciousness" -- that this is the centerpiece of Mr. Jaynes' case,2 
I shall begin by examining his claims regarding the nature of this 
supposed transformation in the quality of human experience. 
An introductory chapter reviews earlier answers to the 
question, what is consciousness -- answers which Mr. Jaynes rejects 
as wholly inadequate. From this spectacular history of failure (I 
agree with Mr. Jaynes about the inadequacy), one might reasonably 
conclude that the question has been incorrectly'posed, that it is 
incapable of being answered in the form in which it has been posed. 
But Mr. Jaynes does not consider this possibility; instead, the 
chapter ends with the observation, "we must therefore try to make 
a new beginning by stating what consciousness is" (p. 18), and 
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Chapter 2 is duly devoted to setting out the answer that, for the 
first time, really and finally explains not only what consciousness 
is but whence it comes. 
Consciousness arises, according to Mr. Jaynes, from language, 
and specifically from metaphor. If one tries to unpack this gnomic 
saying, one gets something like the following series of propositions. 
(1) We 3 tend to think about and talk about consciousness as occurring 
in some sort of container (e.g., "I haven't an idea in my head"). 
(2) This is a metaphor. (3) Metaphors are misleading if they are 
taken literally, i.e., if we fail to understand that they are metaphors. 
(4) This sort of confusion -- the literalizing of metaphor -- has 
occurred in the case of consciousness. (5) Consciousness is not 
(literally) a "thing" or "repository"; it is an "operator," a 
"function" (pp. 55, 58). Who can disagree? But in its unpacked form 
Mr. Jaynes' great discovery is hardly a novelty: writers as diverse as 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Brentano and Sartre, Husserl and Russell 
have all pointed out that it is misleading to spatialize consciousness 
and that our conclusions about the self are (as Nietzche remarked) 
"formulated out of our grammatical custom." 4 
Let us agree, then, that the language in which talk about 
consciousness is conducted is metaphorical. But does it follow, as 
Mr. Jaynes claims, that consciousness "is" metaphorical or that it 
has been "created" by metaphor? Certainly the experiential field of 
people who possess language is very different from the experiential 
field of people (e.g., babies) who lack language. In one sense of the 
term "creates" one can therefore say that language creates the world 
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of people who possess language -- in the sense, namely, that their 
experience would be very different without it. But in this sense of 
"creates"; language creates everything else as well, for everything 
in the experience of people who possess language is touched, colored 
and shaped by language. Thus there is nothing unique, spectacular, 
or even particularly interesting in attributing the origin of 
consciousness to language -- in this sense of "creates." Now there 
is another sense of "create," in which the term means cause, produce, 
or generate, and it would indeed be spectacular if language created 
consciousness in this sense of "creates." But in this sense of 
"create," language (and specifically metaphor) does net create, it 
discovers, the similarities that language marks. It is, I think, 
only because Mr. Jaynes' acc.ount of the "origin of consciousness" 
slips back and forth between these two meanings of "creates" that 
his account has any plausibility whatever. 
Consider, for instance, his exposition of the metaphor, "My 
love is like a tin smith's scoop, sunk past its gleam in the meal-box." 
The immediate correspondence here of metaphrand and metaphier, 
of being out of casual sight, is trivial. Instead, it is 
the paraphrands of this metaphor which created what could not 
possibly be there, the enduring careful shape and hidden 
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shiningness and holdingness of a lasting love deep in the heavy 
manipulable softness of mounding time. • Love has not 
such properties except as we generate them by metaphor 
(pp. 57-8). 
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Mr. Jaynes is a good literary critic in that he calls our attention to 
similarities that we might otherwise have missed but that may 
nonetheless have been operating in our sense of the "rightness" of 
the metaphor. But a poet or a critic discovers an overlooked 
similarity in the experiential field; he does not "create" it. Indeed, 
a metaphor "works" and so becomes a permanent part of the vocabulary 
only because experience confirms it. Verbalizing the experienced 
similarity does indeed create something: what it creates is a verbal 
token that enters into social discourse, that "stands for" the 
experienced similarity, and that may eventually be substituted for 
it: the experienced similarity that the token represents may drop 
out of experience and be replaced by the token. That is literalization. 
Mr. Jaynes' reasoning can be condensed into the following: 
(1) No consciousness without metaphor; therefore, (2) metaphor causes 
consciousness. This is about equivalent to the following analysis of 
"front line," an expression sometimes used in military communiques to 
refer to the region of contact between enemy forces: (1) "Front line" 
is a metaphor created during World War I; therefore, (2) "Front line" 
(the expression) created front line (the form of contact between enemy 
forces that existed in World War I). This, surely, is wrong headed 
a novel kind of contact (trench warfare) gradually emerged; someone 
noticed that the trenches are in certain respects like lines and said 
so. Because the expression called attention to an important, and 
novel, feature of contact between enemy forces in this war, it took 
on -- it entered the common vocabulary. But once there, it acquired 
a life of its own: people who literalized the metaphor slipped into 
assumptions about the nature of trench warfare that were false, 
assumptions that might, on occasion, be militarily disastrous. 
Metaphor, we may say, discovers genuine similarities; it may, on 
occasion create false ones through overextension. 
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If we judge that some metaphor (any metaphor) has become 
irremediably overextended in this way -- if we fear that we cannot 
escape the language trap of taking this metaphor literally -- then 
we might decide to abandon the expression that is the token of the 
metaphor. Let us, we might urge, cease to talk about front lines; 
that sort of talk is too misleading. 
This is my recommendation regarding the term "consciousness." 
I think it should be dropped from any rigorous vocabulary; it has 
been ruined by our tendency to reify it, to take a spatial metaphor 
literally. The seductive power of this particular language trap is 
demonstrated, I think, by Mr. Jaynes' own discussion: though he 
tells us that consciousness is not a thing, only a function, he slips 
back into thinking about it as if it were a thing -- hence the pseudo 
questions with which the chapter is concerned. What "is" consciousness? 
What is "its" cause? 
Well, then, if we are to abandon the term "consciousness," 
what term, or terms, are we to use in its place -- terms that we can 
hope are less misleading because they are morr resistant to 
literalization? I suggest that what Mr. Jaynes is really concerned 
with is what I would call "deliberation," or "reflection," or 
"consideration of alternative possibilities." We all know what such 
terms refer to, and would agree, I believe, that much of the time, 
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people do not deliberate, reflect, or consider alternatives. Much of 
the time, most of the time perhaps, people respond, unreflectively, 
with learned routines, to perceived cues. These responses may be 
short behavioral outcomes or they may consist of long, complex 
serials; people even acquire meta-routines that can be brought into 
play (without reflection) when some serial breaks down. 
Mr. Jaynes does not of course dissent from any of this, 
though he uses other terms to describe the process: 
In driving a car, I am not sitting like a back-seat driver 
directing myself. I am related to a world I immediately 
obey in the sense of driving on the road and not on the 
sidewalk. And I am not conscious of any of this. And 
certainly not logical about it. I am caught up, 
enthralled, if you will, in a total intersecting reciprocity 
of stimulation that may be constantly threatening, or 
comforting, appealing or repelling, responding to the changes 
in traffic and particular aspects of it with trepidation or 
confidence, trust or distrust, while my consciousness is still 
off on other topics. (pp. 84-5). 
But now, suppose it happens that on some occasion none of the routines 
or meta-routines that are a part of our behavioral repertoire is 
appropriate. Then, characteristically, we begin to reflect; we 
consider alternatives. These alternatives are optional scenarios; 
they may be "sketchy" or they may be worked out in detail; they may 
have very short, or very long, time horizons. They may involve 
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projections of ourselves into various possible futures which we 
compare. One can certainly, if one likes, characterize this process 
as involving "narratization," an analogue "I," and a metaphor "me," 
though I don't think we gain much by doing so. In any case, however, 
we are now in a position to reformulate Mr. Jaynes' central contention 
without reference to the misleading expression "origins of 
consciousness": Before the end of the third millennium people never, 
under absolutely no circumstances, reflected (however briefly); they 
never considered alternatives (however sketchy and with however short 
time horizons). 
That is Mr. Jaynes' hypothesis. Before we consider the 
evidence which, in Mr. Jaynes' view, validates it, we most briefly 
examine the other three postulated changes and ask how Mr. Jaynes 
conceives them to be related to this change in the structure of 
human experience which we have been discussing. Consider first the 
matter of social control by means of hallucinated voices. Some such 
hypothesis seems essential if deliberation (what Mr. Jaynes calls 
consciousness) originated at the time and in the way Mr. Jaynes claims. 
Deliberation (the projection of alternative scenarios) commonly 
occurs, even in our modern societies, only when some behavioral 
routine breaks down and no appropriate meta-routine is immediately 
available. Breakdowns of behavioral routine mu~t have occurred in 
pre-third-millennial times. Why, then, did not deliberation ensue? 
Obviously Mr. Jaynes must find some reason and his explanation is that 
at the very moment a breakdown occurred and before deliberation had 
time to begin, a hallucinated voice spoke to pre-third-millennium 
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man and told him exactly what to do. 
The voice-hallucination hypothesis is also an answer to an 
otherwise insoluble puzzle about the nature of social control in 
pre-third-millennium times. Every form of social control that we 
know -- threat, bribery, cajolery, and rational persuasion, for 
instance -- presupposes some capacity, however slight, for 
reflection and deliberation. That is, to use Mr. Jaynes language, 
they all presuppose some form, however, fugitive, of an analogue "I" 
and a metaphor "me." Thus his account of the origin of consciousness 
requires that there be a form of social control that is as automatic 
and as unthinking as are routinized responses to sensory cues, i.e. 
a voice believed to be divine and which one therefore obeys instantly 
and without question. 
But the voice-hallucination hypothesis is not dependent in 
a corresponding way on Mr. Jaynes' account of the origin of 
consciousness, for belief in divine voices, and faithful adherence 
to their commands, would seem to be compatible with at least a 
considerable refinement of deliberation. Thus the evidential 
relation between the two hypotheses may be expressed in the following 
way: Let 'p' stand for the origin-of-consciousness hypothesis and 
'q' for the voice-hallucination hypothesis. Then, p ~ q, and q J p. 
Accordingly, independent evidence for p (i.e., evidence for p that 
it not also direct evidence for q) would tend to strengthen the case 
for q, but independent evidence for q (evidence for q that is not 
also direct evidence for p) would not affect the case for p. 
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Next, as regards the hypothesis that, before the end of 
the third millennium, "everyone" was schizophrenic: Though this is 
discussed as if it were a third great change that occurred simultaneously 
with the origin of consciousness and the decline in the incidence of 
voice hallucination, a little consideration shows that it is simply 
a dramatic, and therefore rhetorically effective, restatement of the 
first and second hypotheses taken together. That this is the case 
follows from Mr. Jaynes' description of "florid unmediated" 
schizophrenia: its symptoms, he writes, "are primarily the presence 
of auditory hallucination . and the deterioration of 
consciousness ••• namely, the loss of the analog 'I,' the erosion 
of mind-space, and an inability to narratize." (p. 408). It may 
indeed be the case that the first and second hypotheses, if confirmed, 
throw some light on the nature of "this most common and resistant of 
illnesses," for schizophrenia would then turn out to be, as Mr. Jaynes 
says, "a vestige of bicamerality, a partial relapse to the bicameral 
mind" (pp. 404-5). But the existence of the disease in historic 
times throws no light on the changes that are supposed to have 
occurred at the end of the third millennium. Rhetoric apart, then, 
the formulation of those changes as involving a radical decline in 
the incidence of schizophrenia adds absolutely nothing to the claims 
already stated in the first two hypothesis. 
Finally, there is the neurological hypothesis regarding the 
supposed transfer of dominance (in right handed people) from the right 
to the left hemisphere. To ask whether certain functions could have 
been localized in the way Mr. Jaynes claims would be to raise a 
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question in neurophysiology that I am not competent to deal with. 
It is possible however to pose another, and more basic question: What 
does Mr. Jaynes hold to be the relation between "brain structure" on 
the one hand, and "psychological phenomena," on the other? Mr. Jaynes 
seems to be of at least two, and possibly more, minds about this. 
At one point, he explicitly rejects what may be called an identity-
theory of the relation between brain state and psychological state. 
There is "a delusion," he writes, "in the all-too-common and 
unspoken tendency to translate psychological phenomena into neuro-
anatomy and chemistry" (p. 18). He also rejects, again quite 
explici tly, all forms of dualism: dualism, "one of the great 
spurious quandries of modern psychology," "began its huge haunted 
career" with the pre-Socratics and included the "arrogant assurances" 
of Descartes (p.. 291). What are we left with? The only positive 
statement I can find is the following: 
Of course it is extremely hazardous thinking to isomorphize 
between a conceptual analysis of a psychological phenomenon 
and its concomitant brain structure, yet this is what we 
cannot avoid doing. (p. 102). 
That sounds remarkably like the philosophical theory called 
"parallelism," and since parallelism has had a long and unhappy 
history it is not very encouraging. But, having assumed isomorphism 
despite its hazards, Mr. Jaynes proceeds as if no hazards are 
involved. Thus he shifts back and forth all too easily from 
psychological language to physiological language, often in the same 
sentence. For instance: 
In bicameral men • • • volition came as a voice that was in 
the nature of a neurological command. (p. 99). 
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Each person has a part of his nervous system which was divine, 
by which he was ordered about. (p. 201). 
. an inaccessible voice in the nervous system • • . 
(p. 301). 
Is it possible that what corresponds to Wernicke's area on 
the right hemisphere 'looks down' on Wernicke's area on the 
left? (p. 349). 
authority figures created by the nervous system out 
of the patient's admonitory experiences ••• (p. 411). 
This is roughly equivalent to writing: "La donna ist very belle" 
which is odd, but at least intelligible because Italian, German, 
English and French are roughly equivalent languages (they are 
isomorphic). The sentences I have just quoted from Mr. Jaynes are 
equally odd, but there is no way of knowing whether or not they are 
intelligible, because it is far from settled that neurophysiology 
and psychology are equivalent languages. Mr. Jaynes is actually in 
the situation of Eqyptologists before the Rose~ta stone was deciphered. 
There were the two texts but nobody knew whether they were isomorphic 
or not. For all the Egyptologists knew, one text might be a 
declaration of war, the other a treaty of peace. But Mr. Jaynes 
writes as if his Rosetta stone has already been deciphered -- as if 
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the explanatory paradigms used in physiology and formulated in its 
language are known to be isomorphic with the explanatory paradigms 
used in psychology and formulated in its language. 
Therefore, pending demonstration of the isomorphism 
Mr. Jaynes posits, I think we must regard the origin-of-consciousness 
hypothesis and the voice-hallucination hypothesis as independent of 
the shift-of-dominance hypothesis. Evidence for the first two would 
not tend to support the latter, and evidence for the latter, if it 
could be found, would not support the former two. But how could 
evidence for a shift in dominance at the end of the third millennium 
be found independently of some assumptions regarding isomorphism? 
However, though sentences like those cited above are without logical, 
or evidential, justification, they are nonetheless remarkably effective 
rhetorically: they sound convincing and cover what is actually naked 
speculation with a cloak of scientific respectability. 
I shall return to this characteristic of Mr. Jaynes' prose 
when we examine the reasons for the book's success. Meanwhile we 
must evaluate the evidence which he has marshalled to support his 
assertion that great changes occurred at the end of the third 
millennium -- changes that turn out, as we have just seen, to be two, 
rather than four, in number. The evidence can only be in the form 
of traces -- documents, buildings, monuments, statues, figurines --
that (1) have survived down to our own time, (2) can be dated back 
to times not later than those in which Mr. Jaynes' great changes are 
alleged to have occurred, and (3) differ in specific features from 
any traces firmly dated to times later than those in which the changes 
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are thought to have occurred. Only traces that meet these three 
criteria are available as evidence. For such traces actually to 
become evidence Mr. Jaynes must show that the specific features cited 
are "better understood" on the origin-of-consciousness and the 
voice-hallucination hypotheses than on any alternative hypothesis. 
I shall call this the positive case. It should be 
supplemented by what I shall call the negative case. This would 
consist in showing that the other features of these traces and 
other traces not having these features -- can be explained at least 
as well on the origin-of-consciousness and the voice-hallucination 
hypotheses as on any other hypothesis. The negative case is important 
because, unless it can be made, Mr. Jaynes will be left, at best, 
with two rival explanatory systems, each of which covers only one 
part of the traces that are to be explained. And this would be 
highly unsatisfactory to Mr. Jaynes, who above all else wants a single, 
all-inclusive explanation of the phenomena in question. 
I shall take up first the matter of the negative case. What 
sorts of traces are, at least prima facie, inconsistent with Mr. Jaynes' 
hypotheses? One such class of cases is traces of large-scale 
organizations well before the end of the third millennium. It is 
possible, I suppose, to believe, without too much strain, that very 
small groups (e.g., nuclear families) could livE" on a day-to-day 
basis in a "signal-bound [condition], that is, responding each minute 
to cues in a stimulus-response manner, and controlled by those cues" 
(p. 140). But with larger groups -- even with groups no larger than 
an extended family -- it takes extreme dedication to a hypothesis to 
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continue to hold, that the members could live out their lives in a 
completely signal-bound condition. And of course there are many 
traces from very early times of large organizations with fairly 
elaborate bureaucratic structures. 
Mr. Jaynes is of course not unaware of the intrinsic 
implausibility of the voice-hallucination hypothesis when it is 
applied to large-scale organizations. He suggests the possibility 
that in such societies the hallucinated voices may have been 
hierarchically organized. This sounds like an ad-hoc hypothesis on 
a par with the epi-cycles that were introduced to support the 
geocentric hypothesis. And in any case, would hierarchically 
organized voices eliminate the possibility, even in very small 
societies, of the kind of breakdown in routines that, as we have 
already suggested, leads to deliberation? It seems highly probable 
that they would not. However well organized into hierarchies the 
voices might be, they could hardly fail, on occasion, to give 
conflicting instructions, or instructions that were inappropriate 
for the situation in which "the gods' slaves" found themselves. It 
is a feature of instructions, however carefully designed, that they 
are too general to cover all possible circumstances: this is why 
judges and administrators are needed -- to find the relevant rule 
and apply it to the particular case. Mr. Jaynes himself agrees that 
eventually organizations became too large for control by hallucinated 
voices, however hierarchically organized. He suggests the Intermediate 
Period in Egypt as the period when this occurred. I am simply 
pointing out that it must have occurred much earlier, if indeed 
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there ever was a time when men were actually automata who "responded 
every minute to cues in a stimulus-response manner." 
It is easy to think of other kinds of traces that seem 
inconsistent with Mr. Jaynes' hypotheses, but I shall resist the 
temptation to discuss them. After all, this paper is not a full-dress 
review of The Origin .• . , but a case study in the sociology of 
belief, and I need therefore only sample Mr. Jaynes' argument 
enough to show that grounds other than evidence must be at work in 
generating belief. Let me therefore simply summarize my comments on 
the negative case by saying that Mr. Jaynes is far from having 
completed it and that the onus probandi lies on him to complete it. 
Next as regards the positive case: here, bearing 
in mind that the origin-of-consciousness hypothesis and the voice-
hallucination hypothesis are not logically symmetrical, we must 
distinguish traces that are claimed as evidence for the former from 
traces that are claimed as evidence for the latter. Generally 
speaking, the evidence for the former is documentary -- for instance 
the text of the Iliad and "the dispute of a man with his Ba" -- while 
the evidence assembled for the latter consists in traces of buildings 
(any large structure that is not a dwelling and that has no other 
practical use), figurines (especially those with staring eyes), and 
burial practices (for instance, the burial of important dead as if they 
still lived). 
I shall confine myself to discussing one example of the mass 
of evidence assembled for each hypothesis. Consider then the 
cuneiform texts that contain signs which Mr. Jaynes believes are 
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equivalent to such English expressions as "speaking," "uttering," 
"hearing," and "listening." I submit that we do not know enough 
about the authors of these texts nor about the genres that the texts 
represent to be sure that these English words are correct translations 
of the cuneiform signs. Nor, if indeed they are correct, do we know 
whether the expressions are to be understood metaphorically or 
(as Mr. Jaynes would have it) literally. Our conclusion can only be 
"not proven." 
Or consider the matter of burial practices. There are surely 
many reasons why survivors might have chosen to bury their dead as 
they did. Mr. Jaynes himself suggests one such possibility -- grief. 
Though he rejects this possibility and concludes that survivors 
buried their dead as if they were alive because these survivors were 
literally hearing the voices of the dead who ordered their burial in 
this fashion, he admits that this conclusion is not "necessary," but 
only "consistent" with the evidence (p. 166). But he soon forgets 
the tentativeness that he has for once affirmed and is back once 
again to categorical assertions: "has no clear explanation 
except • " or its equivalent is the phrase with which he usually 
concludes his discussion of any trace that he regards as evidence 
for his hypotheses. 
How are we to account, in a sCientifically trained author, 
for this -- as it seems to me -- unwarranted assurance? And how 
are we to explain why a case that is persuasive5 for one reader seems 
to another at best no more than "not proven"? The account that I 
propose starts from the set of presuppositions underlying our work on 
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nonterminating disagreements and differences in world view, and applies 
these presuppositions to the case before us. I assume, then, that 
the objects of perception and cognition (what is perceived, what is 
understood) are the end results of processes in which some "foreground," 
i.e., some element in the experiential field, is mediated by a 
background structure consisting of memories, generalizations and 
attitudes. Thus the cognitive process involved in the assessment of 
the evidential value of some trace (say, the burial practice described 
above) may be represented as: 
where I 
I f(F,B) 
the interpretation, or assessment, of the evidential 
value of the trace 
F the trace, as foreground 
- and B a background structure 
Obviously, differences in background structure among the individuals 
who happen to be assessing the same trace will result in different 
interpretations of that trace. What, then, might be some of the 
differences in background structure that lead Mr. Jaynes and his 
critics to such radically different interpretations of the same 
evidence? I shall concentrate on three such differences -- differences 
in what I shall call cosmological orientation, 'without suggesting 
that these are the only differences involved. 
First, then, Mr. Jaynes has a preference for abrupt, dramatic 
and radical change -- a bias against gradualism and for discontinuity. 
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This preference shows up in Mr. Jaynes references to "a huge 
alteration in human mentality" and to "dramatic change," in his 
liking for the expression "de novo," and even in the title of his 
book. More importantly, I suggest that it accounts for his quite 
extraordinary hostility to Darwin. Since Darwinism reduces great 
changes to a very large number of very small changes occurring over 
immense times, it may be said to emphasize continuities instead of 
discontinuities, and to substitute a doctrine of gradualism for a 
doctrine of quantum leaps from one state to another wholly different 
one. No wonder, then, that Mr. Jaynes holds that Darwin "clouded the 
problem with his own naivete" and that the theory of natural 
selection is "a very suspicious totem of evolutionary mythology" 
(p. 9). 
Second, he has a bias against consciousness -- against 
narration, spatialization, the analog "I" and the metaphor "me" 
and a corresponding bias in favor of the unconscious state that 
he calls bicamerality -- the state in which there is no reflection, 
no deliberation, and no interior debate because the gods speak 
directly to men. Thus, for instance, Mr. Jaynes writes with evident 
sympathy of the "yearning for divine volition and service that is 
with us still" (p. 313, see also p. 318); he contrasts the "sands 
of subjective uncertainties" that characterize modern life (p. 320) 
with the "absolutes" of life in bicameral times; and he describes 
the "nostalgic anguish" that "subjectively conscious people" feel 
for "the lost bicamerality" (p. 297). And when he discusses modern 
schizophrenia it is in terms reminiscent of R. D. Laing's thesis 
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that schizophrenics are the only sane people in our insane modern 
world: the problem for the modern schizophrenic, Jaynes writes, 
is that his "relapse" into bicamerality 
is only partial. The learnings that make up a subjective 
consciousness are powerful and never totally suppressed. And 
thus the terror and the fury; the agony and the despair • 
the lack of cultural support and definition for the voices • 
produces a social environment that is a far different thing 
from the behavior of the absolutely social individual of 
bicameral societies. (p. 432). 
Mr. Jaynes, it would seem, holds that we would all be better off if 
"everyone" were once again schizophrenic, if we could somehow return 
to a bicameral society which the disease of thinking too precisely 
on the event, the anguish of decision-making in an uncertain world, 
had not yet infected. 
The third, and last, cosmological orientations that I shall 
mention is Mr. Jaynes' desire for a sweeping, all-inclasive formula 
that explains everything that has happened, from the frequency of 
the occurrence of pop-eyed figurines and the oracle at Delphi to 
modern hypnosis and schizophrenia. Thanks to his discovery of the 
changes that occurred toward the end of the thtrd millennium Be it 
is possible, he believes, to view world history as a "drama," as an 
"immense scenario" (p. 436). So, too, in a particularly revealing 
passage: 
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We are now at last in a position where we can look back and 
see the history of mankind of this planet in its proper value 
for the first time. Our view of human history here must be 
that of the far furthest gradeur •• We see mankind against 
his entire evolutionary background, where civilizations, 
including our own, are but as mountain peaks in a particular 
range against the sky. (p. 317). 
Since, in my view at least, Mr. Jaynes' book reflects these 
three cosmological orientations very strongly, only those who share 
these biases to some degree are likely to find the book convincing; 
those who do not will reject his arguments in whole or in part. 
I shall discuss the latter point first. Consider, then, 
Mr. Jaynes' hostility to Darwin, his rejection of natural selection, 
and his insistence that consciousness emerged suddenly from a type 
of human experience that was radically different in kind. The 
alternative hypothesis is that no radical break occurred, either 
toward the end of the third millennium or elsewhere. Rather, 
deliberation (whether measured in terms of frequency of occurrence, 
variety of alternatives examined, complexity of scenarios reviewed, 
and length of time-horizons taken into account) has been a component, 
however flickering, in human experience from the earliest times. 
Indeed, such a component can be inferred in the behavior of the other 
primates and perhaps in other animals as well. In a word, Mr. Jaynes' 
central hypothesis presupposes a discontinuity bias and is unlikely 
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to appeal to those whose cosmological orientation emphasizes 
continuities and who tend, therefore, to treat all changes as 
differences in degree, rather than as differences in kind. 
Or consider Mr. Jaynes' belief in an all-inclusive, complete 
explanation of the course of human history. Leaving aside for the 
moment the particular explanation he has proposed, many historians 
are profoundly skeptical of any single explanatory principle. Whereas 
writers like Toynbee and Sorokin and Spengler seem to share Mr. Jaynes' 
conviction that, though the world may have the superficial appearance 
of a mighty maze, it is nevertheless not without a plan, other 
historians see only "the turbulent movement" of "an unfathomed sea" 
and confess that, if there be a plan, it is "on a scale beyond [our] 
6 
comprehension." Historians who share Mr. Jaynes' cosmological 
orientation -- this is my thesis -- will take more seriously any 
trace put forward as containing evidence for some "immense scenario" 
than will historians who are skeptical of the very possibility of such 
scenarios. Given a difference in background structure (B) of this 
magnitude, the same evidence (F), will be interpreted (I) very 
differently, and a nonterminating disagreement is likely to ensue. 
But this contrast in cosmological orientation is of course 
by no means confined to historians. Scientists, too, are likely to 
have a differential tolerance for what all s~ientists recognize must 
be a certain looseness of fit between any given hypothesis and the 
evidence assembled for it. All may agree that, ideally, the 
evidence ought to fit so neatly that no alternative explanation is 
possible. All may also agree that this ideal is not attainable in 
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real life. Finally, all probably agree that, the more inclusive the 
hypothesis, the looser the fit is likely to be, but that, scope being 
a positive good, we ought to be willing to tolerate a certain 
looseness of fit in hypotheses of very great scope. But how much is 
scope worth? Differential evaluations of the worth of scope are 
responsible, in part, for the nonterminating disagreements that arise 
from time to time in all scientific disciplines. 7 
So much in general. If we now apply these observations 
to the examination that neurologists, archaeologists, linguists and 
psychologists might make of those parts of Mr. Jaynes' discussion 
that are relevant to their particular disciplines, I predict that 
they would make differential assessments of the evidential value of 
the traces he cites -- assessments that reflect a differential 
tolerance for looseness of fit on the part of the scientists 
concerned. Nevertheless, and taking Mr. Jaynes' argument as a whole, 
I also predict that the reaction of most scientists would be skeptical 
if not hostile. If that were to prove to be the case, it would be 
due, I think, chiefly to the fact that by training, and even more 
perhaps by temperament, their mistrust of simplicity (following 
Claude Bernard's injuction) is far greater than Mr. Jaynes. 
Indeed, in any cost benefit analysis that Mr. Jaynes might 
make of the relative values of seeking and of mistrusting simplicity, 
the value he would assign to simplicity would outweigh any possible 
benefits that might be derived from mistrust. One is inclined to 
say that, so far from mistrusting simplicity, Mr. Jaynes revels in 
it. This being the case, we have to conclude that, despite its 
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scientific trappings, his book is not a scientific treatise at 
all -- not scientific history nor scientific archaeology nor 
scientific neurophysiology. And if that is the case, then it should 
not be judged by the usual criterian for assessing scientific 
hypothesis. 
But if the book is not a scientific treatise, what is it? 
And what criteria are appropriate for evaluating it? I think that 
Mr. Jaynes is not so much offering us evidence as a vision -- not 
evidence that we are to weigh, but a vision that may win us, not 
because it fits the facts more or less loosely, but because it 
satisfies some deep, and extracognitive, needs of our natures. 
In a word, Mr. Jaynes' book belongs to the same genre as A Study of 
History and The Decline of the West, the genre that I call secular 
theology -- "theology" because, like the great theological works of 
past ages, it presents a vision of the world as a whole. I call it 
"secular" both because this vision is confined to what St. Augustine 
called "the earthly city" and also because it is composed in a 
language that looks scientific, rather than in the language of 
theology. 
This certainly does not dissolve the disagreement between 
Mr. Jaynes and his critics but it does refocus it. The disagreement, 
properly understood, is not over whether the evidence Mr. Jaynes 
presents warrants the conclusions he reaches -- obviously it does 
not -- for the traces he discusses are not, strictly speaking, evidence 
and the assertions he makes are not, strictly speaking, conclusions. 
The disagreement is over the utility of a kind of writing in which 
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what looks like evidence and conclusions is but the articulation of 
"an immense scenario" which appeals, if it does appeal, because of 
its immensity and not because of the evidence for it. It is a 
disagreement, in a word, over the value of secular theology. 
My description of Mr. Jaynes' book as secular theology has 
already brought us to the final topic of this paper the reasons for 
its success, despite its lack of scientific rigor. We now see that it 
is not, despite, but precisely because of, its lack of rigor that 
the book appeals. It appeals because in our secularized society 
there are still people who crave certainty, absolutes, final solutions, 
a meaningful world rather than a merely turbulent sea. On the other 
hand, these same people are too much persuaded of the preeminence 
of science as the way to truth, to accept any assertions that seem to 
lack the cachet of science. Secular theology is the literary form 
that both gives expression to, and that seeks to reconcile, these 
two strains in modern culture. B 
If I am right, then, one source of the book's appeal is 
that it is a new gospel, a world-picture startlingly different from any 
we are accustomed to and one in which everything has its secure place 
and all is accounted for. But that is not the book's sole source of 
appeal. It attracts as well those who resonate with the romantic 
primitivism expressed in Mr. Jaynes' longing for "lost bicamerality." 
Dislike, distrust, of consciousness is almost a hallmark of modern 
culture. 9 It began at least as long ago as Dostoevsky, it is strongly 
expressed in Nietzsche,IO it is a principal motif in Lawrence,ll it 
dominates Sartre -- think of his anguish (not too strong a word) at 
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his inability to collapse his pour-soi mode of being into the en-sol. 12 
And what is true of the high culture is as characteristic of low and 
middle-brow culture Zen, transcendental meditation, sensitivity 
training and the other phenomena of the counterculture that arose in 
the 60s and that are still with us. People who participate in this 
climate of opinion are likely to resonate with the thesis that 
consciousness is a late, dateable, and on the whole regrettable arrival 
on the human scene. 
Resonances of this kind, then, are important elements in 
the formation of belief. Belief is certainly on occasion generated 
by evidence, but it is seldom generated purely, or exclusively, by 
evidence. Given the looseness of fit that chracterizes the relation 
between generalizations and data, something more than, or different 
from, evidence often tips the scales in the direction of one alternative 
rather than another. Usually the role of these extra-cognitive 
elements in inducing belief is not very noticeable. Mr. Jaynes' book 
is useful precisely because the role of such extra-cognitive elements 
as the three cosmological orientations I have been discussing is plain 
to see. This is why his book is a good case study in the sociology 
of belief. 13 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. J. Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the 
Bicameral Mind (Boston, 1977). 
2. The primacy of the origin of consciousness in Mr. Jaynes' thinking 
was confirmed by him in the panel discussion at Caltech in 
November 1978. 
3. It is not at all clear who "we" are -- here or elsewhere in the 
book. Is "we" the speakers of what Whorf called SAE? or is it 
modern (how modern?) man? or post-third-millennium man? or 
only the author and his reader? I suspect that the denotation 
of "we" shifts from one occasion to another. 
4. Beyond Good and Evil (trans. by M. Cowan), Chicago, 1955, p. 19. 
5. At one point during the panel discussion Mr. Jaynes remarked, 
rather complacently, I thought, that his conclusions regarding 
lateralization and localization of function were "astonishing." 
"Incredible," replied Eron Zaidel. That is the kind of difference 
in assessment that I hope to explain. 
6. Cambridge Medieval History VIII, 819; E. L. Woodward, Short Journey 
(London, 1942), 141. 
28 
7. It was Claude Bernard, I think, who urged his fellow scientists 
to "seek simplicity: but to "mistrust" it. The fact that all 
scientists probably agree with this advice, and hold that they 
actually follow it, does not prevent disagreements from occurring. 
To the extent that scientists do a kind of cost/benefit analysis 
of the relative values of seeking and mistrusting simplicity 
they will compute the payoff differently if they weigh differently 
the probability of cosmological simplicity. 
8. Most secular theologians would indignantly reject this account 
of how their writings function in generating belief; I am not 
at all sure that Mr. Jaynes would. My reason is a remark 
inserted at the very end of his book. This remark follows his 
account of what he calls "scientism," a kind of thinking that 
is exemplified by such schools of thought as Marxism, psychoanalysis 
and behaviorism. All scientisms, according to Mr. Jaynes, have 
certain features in common: a "rational splendor" that "explains 
everything," a "charismatic leader," a series of canonical texts, 
and the requirement of total commitment. It will be seen that the 
genre that I have characterized as secular theology is identical 
with Mr. Jaynes' scientism, which, as he will say, "are clusters 
of scientific ideas which come together • • • into creeds of 
beliefs, scientific mythologies which fill the felt void left by 
the divorce of science and religion in our time" (p. 441). But 
now, having giving this devastating indictment of scientism, or 
secular theology, Mr. Jaynes casually remarks, "and this essay 
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is no exception." 
When during the panel discussion I quoted this sentence to 
Mr. Jaynes and asked what we are to make of it, he evaded me. I 
think he cannot want to face its implications. For, in the 
whole book, up to this final page, Mr. Jaynes has written in a 
way that leads every reader to assume that Mr. Jaynes expects his 
assertions to be tested by scientific, not by visionary, criteria. 
If, as he was finishing it, it occurred to him that he had written 
not a scientific paper, but a visionary tract, no wonder that the 
discovery, if acknowledged at all, is made in such an off-hand way. 
9. The protagonist of Notes from the Underground held that "any 
sort of consciousness is a disease." 
10. For instance, in "On Truth and Lie": "In some remote corner of 
the universe, poured out and glittering in innumerable solar systems, 
there once was a star on which clever animals invented knowledge. 
That was the haughtiest and most mendacious minuite of 'world 
history' -- yet only a minute." 
11. Thus Birkin in Women in Love: "You yourself, don't you find it 
a beautiful clean thought, a world empty of people, just uninterrupted 
grass, and a hare sitting up?" 
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12 In Nausea, Roquetin says, "I, too, wanted to be," and in The 
Reprieve Daniel, a homosexual, exclaims "Just to be in the dark, 
at random! To be homosexual just as the oak is an oak. To 
extinguish myself." 
13. Some readers may accuse me of being as speculative about Mr. Jaynes 
as I accuse Mr. Jaynes of being about bicamerality. But my 
suggestions, unlike Mr. Jaynes', need not remain merely speculations. 
As a result of the work on world views that my collaborators and 
I have done, we now have considerable experience in testing 
hypotheses regarding the ways in which different cosmological 
orientations are expressed in various kinds of cultural products. 
Hence, though the orientations I have attributed to Mr. Jaynes are 
not among those we have already studied, it would be possible, 
were it though worthwhile, to apply the procedures we have used in 
other cases to Mr. Jaynes' case. As for my suggestion that 
Mr. Jaynes' book appeals chiefly to those who resonate with its 
underlying cosmological orientations: although we have not yet 
carried out tests of this kind, we know in principle how to go 
about it. The principal problem is not theoretical but practical: 
it is the problem of finding enough readers of the book to obtain 
a statistically significant sample. 
